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QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGNERS
Quasi in rem jurisdiction has long been a useful weapon in the hands
of American plaintiffs suing foreign defendants over whom personal juris-
diction cannot be obtained. The United States Supreme Court's decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner, I which subjected the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion to the reasonableness test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2
casts doubt as to whether this jurisdictional weapon retains its potency.
This Note will explore the extent to which quasi in rem jurisdiction
remains effective in the international setting. First, a general examination
will be made of the survival of quasi in rem jurisdiction after Shaffer. Sec-
ond, the focus will narrow to jurisdiction by necessity-a type of quasi in
rem jurisdiction that a plaintiff may invoke when no alternative forum is
available-and its survival after Shaffer. Third, the focus will further nar-
row to the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction by necessity in international
litigation, that is, when only one American forum is available to the plain-
tiff. Finally, the Note will consider the international implications of con-
tinued use of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
I
QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION AFTER SHAFFER
Plaintiff Heitner initiated a shareholder's derivative action in Dela-
ware, naming as defendants Greyhound Corporation (a Delaware corpora-
tion having its principal place of business in Arizona), a wholly owned
subsidiary of Greyhound, and twenty-eight individuals who were present or
former officers or directors of one or both of the corporations. The plaintiff
alleged that breaches of fiduciary duties by the individual defendants had
caused the corporations to violate federal antitrust laws and incur civil and
criminal penalties in excess of thirteen million dollars. Neither the plaintiff
nor any of the individual defendants were residents of Delaware, and none
of the acts complained of by the plaintiff had occurred in Delaware.
Proceeding under a Delaware sequestration statute,3 Heitner obtained
quasi in rem jurisdiction with respect to the individual defendants through
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See note 7 infra.
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(a) (1975). This statute provides for seizure of a nonres-
ident defendant's property to compel the defendant to enter a general appearance in the Dela-
ware courts.
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the court-ordered seizure of Greyhound Corporation stock belonging to
those defendants. 4 Although none of the stock seized was physically pres-
ent in Delaware, another statute provided that, for purposes of attachment,
Delaware was the situs of all stock in Delaware corporations.5
The individual defendants objected to the exercise of quasi in rem ju-
risdiction on several grounds,6 one of which was that "under the rule of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington they did not have sufficient contacts
with Delaware to sustain the jurisdiction of that State's courts."'7 The Del-
aware Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction, summarily dismissing the de-
fendants' jurisdictional objection by deeming the minimum contacts rule of
International Shoe irrelevant to the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction.8
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that
continued adherence to the fiction whereby in rem and quasi in rem actions
are deemed to be brought against property rather than against the owners
of that property would be fundamentally unfair to defendants. 9 Because the
"interests of persons in a thing" are really at stake in such actions,10 the
Court held that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its prog-
eny."1
1
The Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer has been interpreted by many
commentators to mean many different things. 12 The decision's aura of
4. The stock belonging to the individual defendants that was seized pursuant to the stat-
ute was worth approximately $1.2 million. 433 U.S. at 192 n.7.
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975). This statute was subsequently held to be uncon-
stitutional United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1977).
6. In addition to the objection to jurisdiction that is the basis of the Supreme Court's
opinion and that is the focus of this Note, the defendants argued that "the exparte sequestra-
tion procedure did not accord them due process of law and that the property seized was not
capable of attachment in Delaware." 433 U.S. at 193.
7. Id. (citation omitted). The language of International Shoe usually quoted as its rule is
that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."
326 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted).
8. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229, 235-36 (Del. 1976).
9. 433 U.S. at 212.
10. Id. at 207. The Court quoted this language from the Introductory Note to RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1971).
11. 433 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted). The progeny of International Shoe are those cases
following it that developed its rule, see note 7 supra, into the reasonableness standard applied
by the Court in Shaffer. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
12. A flood of writing has followed the Shaffer decision. Cited here are a few examples
that bear on some of the ideas discussed in this Note. See, eg., Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner. An
End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory, 26 KANSAS L. REV. 61 (1977); Fischer, "Winimum
Contacts'" Shaffer's Un/fed Jurisdictional Test, 12 VAL. U.L. REv. 25 (1977); Leathers, Sub-
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progressiveness 13 masks numerous unexplained complexities, 14 which only
closer inspection reveals and only future litigation will resolve. Nonethe-
less, Shaffer indisputably accomplished one thing: it set aside the long-
standing rule that a state can always exercise jurisdiction solely because of
its power over property within its borders. Exercises of quasi in rem juris-
diction must now be scrutinized under the reasonableness test of Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny.
The Court's holding in Shaffer does not mean, however, that quasi in
rem jurisdiction no longer exists. The Court suggested several circum-
stances in which quasi in rem jurisdiction may still be maintained success-
fully. First, quasi in rem jurisdiction may be reasonable when the plaintiff
seeks to assert a pre-existing interest in the property attached. In such a
situation the property itself is the source of the controversy, thereby usually
stantive Due Process Controls of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 66 Ky. L.J. 1 (1978); Olsen, Shaf-
fer v. Heitner. A Survey of Its Effects on Washington Jurisdiction, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 72 (1977);
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAnv. L. REv. 70, 152-62 (1977); 32 ARK. L. REv. 101
(1978); 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 183 (1978); 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 971 (1978); 46 FORDHAM L.
Rlv. 459 (1977); 63 IowA L. REv. 504 (1977); 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 87 (1977); 57 NEB. L. REV.
523 (1978); 13 TULSA LJ. 82 (1977); 1977 UTAH L. REV. 361; 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51
(1978); 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 131 (1978); 53 WASH. L. REv. 537 (1978).
13. Many commentators have long suggested that the power theory of jurisdiction is out-
moded and that all exercises ofjurisdiction should instead be subject to a reasonableness stan-
dard. See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested.4naysis, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1176-79 (1966); Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Un-
constitutionaI4 49 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 668 (1975).
14. For a good discussion of the complexities that the Supreme Court either created or left
unresolved, see Casad, supra note 12, at 72-77. One of the ambiguities of the decision is
whether a reasonableness test has supplanted the old power test or whether jurisdiction must
now satisfy both a power (minimum contacts) test and a reasonableness test in order to be
constitutionally permissible. This question is of critical importance to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. But it is not pertinent here, because the presence of the property that serves as
the basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction satisfies any power test. Hence, this Note may safely
treat Shaffer as simply applying the reasonableness test to quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court does not distinguish in its decisions between the concepts of minimum
contacts and reasonableness, but rather uses them interchangeably. The terminology used in
this Note-a power test (equated with minimum contacts) as distinct from a reasonableness
test-is not of general applicability. It is derived from analysis of the outcome of the Supreme
Court's decisions rather than from the language they employ. For example, in the recent case
of Kulko v. Superior Court, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978) (an action by a California wife to establish a
foreign divorce decree as a California judgment against a New York husband, to obtain full
custody of the children, and to increase an order for child support), the Court said that "[l]ike
any standard that requires a determination of 'reasonableness,' the 'minimum contacts' test of
International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application." Id. at 1697. The Court
focused on the conduct of the defendant, a resident of New York, in relation to California,
looking for "affiliating circumstances." Id. This suggests that the Court, although couching
its decision in terms of reasonableness, used more of a power, or minimum contacts, test. The
Court looked at the interests of the plaintiff and the state, which would be relevant in a reason-
ableness test, but found them to be weak. Id. at 1700-01. The question left by the case is
whether the result would have been different if the conduct of the defendant was the same but
the interests of the plaintiff and the state were stronger. If the outcome would be different,
then it would suggest that the court was using a reasonableness test rather than a power test.
1979]
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making it reasonable to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction with respect to
that property.15 Second, quasi in rem jurisdiction may be sustained when
the plaintiff wishes to freeze the defendant's property not as a jurisdictional
basis, but as security for a judgment being sought in a forum that can con-
stitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.16 Third, in a
forum in which personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be constitu-
tionally permissible, quasi in rem jurisdiction may be available to the plain-
tiff who wishes to use the defendant's property to satisfy a claim even
though it is unrelated to the property. 17 These three types of quasi in rem
jurisdiction will be of continued interest to American plaintiffs suing for-
eign defendants; but by their very nature they are of limited applicability
and appeal.' 8 Of broader interest and greater utility to American plaintiffs
in international litigation, and of central concern to this Note, is a fourth
possible remnant of quasi in rem jurisdiction: jurisdiction by necessity. 19
Consider the following situation. An American plaintiff desires to sue
a foreign defendant. The prospective defendant does not have sufficient
contacts with the United States to make it reasonable to subject him to per-
sonal jurisdiction anywhere in this country. The defendant does, however,
15. 433 U.S. at 207. This is the first of the two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction, which
the Court described in footnote 17, id. at 199 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958)). A mortgage foreclosure is a typical example of this kind of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The Court set out several reasons why the state should have jurisdiction in this situation: (1) to
meet the property owner's expectation that the state will protect his interests; (2) to assure the
marketability of property located within the state; (3) to assure the resolution of disputes in-
volving that property; and (4) to most conveniently use the important records and witnesses
that would most likely be found in the state. Id. at 208.
16. Id. at 210. For a recent case after Shaffer supporting this kind of quasi in rem juris-
diction, see Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In
that case, the garnishment in California of a debt owed to the defendant by a California corpo-
ration was held to be valid as security for a possible award in an arbitration proceeding in New
York. Although there were insufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant in California, id. at 1046, the court held that there were enough contacts to give it the
limited jurisdiction needed to order the garnishment, id. at 1048.
17. 433 U.S. at 208. This is the second of the two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction. See
id. at 199 n.17 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)). The Court gave as an
example of this type "suits for injury suffered on the land of an absentee owner, where the
defendant's ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related
to rights and duties growing out of that ownership." Id. at 208 (footnote omitted). That is to
say, if a state had a long-arm statute that reached to the constitutional limits ofjurisdiction, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction thereunder would be constitutionally permissible; but the state
might instead choose to limit the plaintiff's assertion ofjurisdiction to quasi in rem. Id. at 208
n.29.
18. For examples of situations in which these three types of quasi in rem jurisdiction will
be of continued interest and use to American plaintiffs, see notes 15-17 supra.
19. The survival of this type was suggested by the Court when it said:
This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question whether the
presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when
no other forum is available to the plaintiff.
Id. at 211 n.37. See also Casad, supra note 12, at 76-77; The Supreme Cour, 1976 Term, supra
note 12, at 162.
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have property in the United States, but it bears no relation to the plaintiff's
claim. In the absence of an alternative American forum, should the, plaintiff
be allowed to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction based solely on the presence
of the defendant's property in the forum?
II
JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY IN DOMESTIC
LITIGATION
A. THE BASIC THEORY
Reasonableness is thus a standard by which all assertions of jurisdic-
tion are to be measured after Shaffer. 20 Implicit in any reasonableness test
is a balancing process, 2 1 which takes into consideration the relevant com-
peting interests--those of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the state.22
Fairness and convenience are the primary interests of the defendant.
As a result, he will often strongly oppose having to defend a claim away
from his home forum. If the defendant is required to do so without suffi-
cient reason, his sense of justice in the litigation process will be offended.
When determining whether jurisdiction should be sustained in a particular
situation, courts' decisions have reflected the traditional bias in favor of the
defendant. The defendant's interests will therefore be dominant unless jus-
tification exists for compelling him to litigate in the forum chosen by the
plaintiff.23
The plaintiffs principal interest is to satisfy his claim against the de-
fendant. He has a strong interest in being heard in the forum of his choos-
ing, which will be that which is most convenient for him. Most often this
will mean that the plaintiff will prefer to sue in his home forum.24
A state has an interest in providing a forum where disputes involving
property within its borders can be resolved 25 and where its citizens can pur-
20. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
21. Smit, The Enduring Utility ofin Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43
BROOKLYN L. REv. 600, 607 (1977).
22. "It is by no means settled which factors are to be considered relevant in this context."
Id. The value of so limiting the analysis to these three interests, however, is that they reflect
"the primary concern of rules of adjudicatory authority." Id. at 608.
23. "jAin essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality and nature' of the defend-
ant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in
that State." Kulko v. Superior Court, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1697 (1978) (citations omitted). Because
the plaintiff is the one "who. . . acts contrary to the social policy that discourages litigation,"
he normally has the burden of pursuing the defendant at the defendant's home. Smit, supra
note 21, at 608; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1127, 1173. This remains true
even though the increased mobility of modem society has made it easier for the defendant to
defend in a court away from home.
24. Smit, supra note 21, at 608.
25. 433 U.S. at 208.
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sue their claims.26 Legislative evidence of a state's concern in particular
areas of law will make the state's interest a stronger factor in determining
the reasonableness of jurisdiction.27 When a state is the only adequate fo-
rum available to the plaintiff, its interest is greatly strengthened in favor of
sustaining jurisdiction to avoid the socially unsatisfactory result of allowing
the controversy to remain unheard altogether.28
The interests of the plaintiff and the state will usually coincide.29 The
plaintiff has a strong interest in finding a forum in which to assert his claim,
and the state normally wants to provide the plaintiff with that forum. Al-
though the state's interest in providing a forum will weaken if the plaintiff is
not a local resident or if there is another forum open to him,30 when only
one forum is available to the plaintiff-the situation posited by this
Note--the state's interests will usually support jurisdiction.
Against the unavailability of an alternative forum for the plaintiff, a
court should balance the "extent [to which] the defendant will be disadvan-
taged by being sued at the [plaintifs] forum rather than at his home."'3 1
The importance of providing a forum for the plaintiff in these circum-
stances may prevail, even though the unfairness to the defendant might
otherwise justify the court's declining jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the availa-
bility of jurisdiction by necessity is not a foregone conclusion every time
only one forum is open to a plaintiff. In each case, the court must still
balance the competing interests to determine whether the defendant may
reasonably be required to travel to the forum selected by the plaintiff to
defend the action. If this burden may reasonably be imposed upon the
defendant, then jurisdiction by necessity will lie.
B. MuLLANE" AN ILLUSTRATION OF JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY
A prototype situation of jurisdiction by necessity in which there were
"compelling reasons for providing a forum" 32 is Mullane v. Centralffanover
Bank & Trust Co. 33 In that case, the trustee of a New York common trust
26. Smit, supra note 21, at 608-09.
27. The plaintiff in Shaffer had unsuccessfully argued that Delaware had strong interests
in supervising the control and management of corporations incorporated under Delaware law.
The Court did not find such a compelling interest. "Delaware law basis [sic] jurisdiction, not
on appellants' status as corporate fiduciaries, but rather on the presence of their property in the
State." 433 U.S. at 214. This suggests that to be a strong factor in the finding ofjurisdiction
the state should have expressed an explicit interest in a certain area of law. Codification would
express such a strong interest.
28. Zammit, supra note 13, at 682; 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 459, 476-77 (1977).
29. Smit, supra note 21, at 611-12.
30. Developments in the Law-State-Court JurLrdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 965 (1960);
46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 459, 477 (1977).
31. Smit, supra note 21, at 611.
32. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1174.
33. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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fund brought an action in New York for a judicial settlement of account.
The action was not a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, since it involved
the adjudication and termination of personal rights of the trust beneficiaries
rather than just the determination of title to the trust.34 The action thus
seemed to require the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the benefi-
ciaries. But upon objection to jurisdiction because some of the nonresident
beneficiaries had not been personally served, the Supreme Court held that
under the circumstances of that case the historical distinctions between in
rem, quasi in rem, and in personam jurisdiction were not useful or neces-
sary. It was
sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition of its chosen pro-
cedure, the interest of [the] state in providing [a forum] ... is so insistent
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to
determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its
procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard.35
The large number of beneficiaries who were residents of other states
meant that no one court could obtain personal jurisdiction over all of them
and that New York was therefore the only adequate forum available to the
plaintiff. In determining whether the New York court should have taken
jurisdiction to settle the account, the Supreme Court weighed the interests
of the parties and of the state. The interests of the individual beneficiaries
were notice and opportunity to be heard as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.36 The plaintiff trustee's interest was to find a forum in which
to determine conclusively his personal liability for any alleged mismanage-
ment of the trust.37 The state had a "vital interest. . . in bringing any
issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement," a goal that could only be
accomplished "if interests or claims of individuals who [were] outside of the
State [could] somehow be determined. '38 On the one hand, the action
would deprive the nonresident beneficiaries of certain property rights.39
But on the other hand, the beneficiaries would receive adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard before any such deprivation took place, and no
34. The personal obligation of the trustee, to be determined in the settlement of the ac-
count, cannot serve as the requisite res for an in rem action. Fraser, Jurisdiction by Neces-
sity-AnAnalysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 309 (1951).
35. 339 U.S. at 313.
36. Id. at 314.
37. Id. at 311.
38. Id. at 313.
39. The Court described the two ways that property rights of the beneficiaries might be
terminated:
It may cut off their rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impair-
ments of their interests. Also, their interests are presumably subject to diminution in
the proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one who, in their names but
without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest.
1979]
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affirmative personal liability would be imposed upon them.40 The Court
thus concluded that jurisdiction should be upheld, because the necessity
that New York be able judicially to settle accounts established under its
laws made jurisdiction over the nonresident beneficiaries reasonable.4 1
C. SURVIVAL OF QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY IN
SHA FFER
Jurisdiction by necessity has thus far been considered either in terms of
personal jurisdiction or, as in Mullane, in terms of a type not classified as
personal, in rem, or quasi in rem. Quasi in rem jurisdiction after Shaffer
may be of special utility in either of two situations to plaintiffs who have
only one forum in which to sue a defendant. In the first situation, the de-
fendant has property in the forum as well as certain "minimum contacts"
with that forum. The state may, however, have a restrictive long-arm stat-
ute, which means that such a defendant will not always be subject to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.42 A state with such a restrictive long-arm
statute has chosen not to exercise its full jurisdictional powers with respect
to personal jurisdiction, thereby creating a gap between the reach of the
long-arm statute and the constitutional limits ofjurisdiction. But the plain-
40. Suggesting that the personal rights at stake were limited, the Court said that the juris-
diction to be asserted had "some characteristics and is wanting in some features of proceedings
both in rem and inpersonam." Id. at 312.
41. See Fraser, supra note 34, at 311.
42. An example of such a restrictive long-arm statute is that which is applied in New
York.
(a) . . . As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this
section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his
executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defama-
tion of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from
the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services ren-
dered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
(c) Where personal jurisdiction is based solely upon this section, an appearance does
not confer such jurisdiction with respect to causes of action not arising from an act
enumerated in this section.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & R. § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1977). By contrast, California has
a nonrestrictive long-arm statute:
A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
[Vol. 12:67
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tiff may still be able constitutionally to assert jurisdiction within that gap by
proceeding under the state's attachment statute.43 That quasi in rem juris-
diction survives Shaffer in this situation is not especially surprising. It will
be of limited use, however, helping only the plaintiff who is suing in a state
that has a restrictive long-arm statute.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction may be of much greater utility in a second
situation. The defendant here has property in the only forum available to
the plaintiff, but the property is unrelated to the plaintiff's claim and the
defendant has no other contacts with that forum. The sole premise for
jurisdiction is thus the presence of the defendant's property.44 Quasi in
rem jurisdiction may be used by the plaintiff to reach the defendant in these
circumstances even though personal jurisdiction would never be constitu-
tionally permissible.45 Although this result seems to contradict the other-
wise restrictive holding of Shaffer, the two can be reconciled upon closer
inspection. The Supreme Court itself suggested this possible exercise of
quasi in rem jurisdiction in a footnote to the Shaffer opinion when it ex-
cluded cases of quasi in rem jurisdiction by necessity from the scope of its
decision.46
43. The consensus of the commentators on Shaffer, see note 12 supra, is that there is now a
single uniform standard of reasonableness for all exercises ofjurisdiction, and thus one consti-
tutional boundary for personal as well as quasi in rem jurisdiction. Commentators have also
suggested that this means quasi in rem jurisdiction will be of continued utility only in situa-
tions in which a state's long-arm statute has not reached to the limits of constitutionally per-
missible jurisdiction. But see text accompanying notes 44-48 infra.
44. Should the attachment of the defendant's property itself be one of the contacts when
deciding whether the defendant has the minimum contacts needed with the state? In In-
termeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978), the Second Circuit up-
held quasi in rem jurisdiction in New York based on the attachment of a debt owed in New
York to the nonresident defendant. The court interpreted Shaffer to mean that "the presence
of the defendant's property within New York must be viewed as only one contact of the de-
fendant with the state, to be considered along with other contacts .. " Id. at 1022. Juris-
diction was reasonable because of the "'substantial connection' of the contract with New
York" and "the added factor of the attachment of an intangible within the jurisdiction of the
state .... " Id. at 1023. The Supreme Court in Shaffer had said only that "although the
presence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among
the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not sup-
port the State's jurisdiction." 433 U.S. at 209. This language seems to indicate that the pres-
ence of the property or its attachment might suggest other contacts but is itself a very minor
factor, if one at all.
45. This does not mean, however, that quasi in rem jurisdiction extends beyond the consti-
tutional limits of jurisdiction. See note 43 supra; note 48 infra. Rather, in this one particular
situation quasi in rem jurisdiction may be reasonable and thus constitutionally permissible
even though the exercise of personal jurisdiction, even under a nonrestrictive long-arm statute,
would not.
46. See note 19 supra. Professor Siegel narrowly interpreted this footnote to mean that
situations covered by it would not be common "except perhaps in wartime." D. SIEGEL,
HANDBOOK ON NEW YORK PRACTICE 125 (1978). Such a narrow interpretation seems unnec-
essary in light of the analysis in this Note. The majority of the commentators on Shaffer, see
note 12 supra while agreeing that there is only one reasonableness standard, cite this footnote
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A state may have territorial power over the property upon which the
plaintiff wishes to base jurisdiction, but Shaffer now requires that the exer-
cise of quasi in rem jurisdiction must also be reasonable.47 When the fail-
ure of the state to provide the plaintiff with a forum would leave him
without any means to pursue a remedy against the defendant, the "neces-
sity" of providing a forum may make it reasonable for the state to exercise
the full extent of its power. Although the state does not have power over
the person of the defendant, it does have power over his property. Quasi in
rem jurisdiction based solely on the property may therefore be reasonable.
This application of quasi in rem jurisdiction after Shaffer is subject to one
caveat: because such jurisdiction is based wholly on the state's power over
the property, to retain its reasonableness any judgment that results from an
action based on such jurisdiction must be limited to the value of the prop-
erty over which the state exercises its power.48
III
APPLICATION OF JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY TO
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
A. THE BASIC THEORY
In the international arena, reasonableness remains the standard by
which an American court should determine whether or not to uphold juris-
diction in a particular action. Again implicit in the reasonableness test is a
balancing process that takes into account the competing interests of the par-
ties and the state. The theory ofjurisdiction by necessity likewise remains
fundamentally the same as in purely domestic litigation.49 The interests of
the parties and of the state change slightly, because the plaintiffs "only
as an exception, without explaining the implications of such a departure from the broad scope
of the decision.
47. For a discussion of this Note's distinction between power (minimum contacts) and
reasonableness, see note 13 supra.
48. Logically, it seems that the limited nature of a quasi in rem judgment, at least the
limited liability if not also the limited size, is a factor that a court should consider in deciding
the reasonableness of any exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Such an analysis would sug-
gest that there are two constitutional standards for the exercise of jurisdiction, with quasi in
rem jurisdiction always reaching beyond where personal jurisdiction would be permissible
because of its limited nature. But the Supreme Court in Shaffer did not agree. 433 U.S. at
207 n.23, 209 n.32. Despite the Court's rejection of this approach, the extraordinary nature of
the proposed jurisdiction demands that the judgment be so limited by allowing the defendant
to enter a limited appearance.
49. No fundamental distinction needs to be drawn between the jurisdictional problems
raised by litigation involving international elements arising in an American court, state or
federal, and those raised by litigation in which the nonlocal elements are connected with
sister states. . . . mThe relevant constitutional considerations seem equally applicable to
the interstate and the international case.
Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1122.
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available forum" in domestic litigation is now his only American forum.
Because of this change, its effect on the interests to be considered, and the
nature of suits involving foreign defendants, the occasions for the use of
jurisdiction by necessity in the international setting will be more frequent.
American courts in international litigation will doubtless sympathize
with an American plaintiff who is suing a foreign defendant. Nonetheless,
American courts should not ignore a foreign defendant's interests solely be-
cause of his status as a foreigner. Rather, his status should be weighed
along with the other circumstances before the court. Fairness and conven-
ience remain the principal interests of the foreign defendant, which means
he will oppose strongly the American plaintiff's attempt to sue him away
from his home country. If the foreign defendant is compelled to defend in
a U.S. court, he will be more significantly inconvenienced than a domestic
defendant, since he will have to travel to a foreign country rather than to a
different state. Furthermore, the foreign defendant's sense of fairness and
justice will be more easily offended if jurisdiction is exercised without ade-
quate justification in the American forum chosen by the plaintiff- the de-
fendant will not only be required to travel to the United States, but once
there he will be subjected to an alien legal system.
An American plaintiff will usually still prefer to have his claim against
a foreign defendant heard in the plaintiff's home forum. But because the
defendant is not a U.S. resident, the plaintiff will now have an even stronger
interest in being able to assert his claim against the defendant somewhere in
the United States. The maxim that the plaintiff must normally pursue the
defendant still applies to international litigation.50 Against this rule, how-
ever, a court should balance the unfairness and inconvenience of requiring
the American plaintiff to leave the country to sue the defendant.5 1 If the
unfairness and inconvenience to the plaintiff would increase greatly, then
the traditional bias in favor of the defendant should weaken accordingly.5 2
When a court is balancing the relative fairness and convenience to the
parties to determine whether jurisdiction in the plaintiffs American forum
would be reasonable, consideration of the nature of the parties' activities is
important.5 3 If, for example, the foreign defendant's activities are interna-
tional in nature-that is, the foreign defendant has contacts with more than
one country-then his inconvenience in defending a claim in the United
50. M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-63 (2d ed. 1950).
51. Smit, supra note 21, at 610-11; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1172 (sug-
gesting that in international litigation courts should broaden their traditional inquiry into the
fairness to the defendant to consider also the fairness to the plaintifi).
52. The Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,223 (1957),
believed that the plaintiff insureds would be "at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to
[go] to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable." It is easy to see that this disad-
vantage would increase if the plaintiff is forced to go to a distant country.
53. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1172.
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States will be less. His interest in being sued at home will thus weaken
accordingly, especially if the plaintif's activities are local in nature-that is,
they are confined to one state.54 But if the foreign defendant's activities are
localized in his country, the American court may not reasonably be able to
require the defendant to defend a claim away from his home, especially if
the plaintiffs activities are now international in nature.5 5 It follows then
that if the plaintiffs activities are international in nature, his interest in be-
ing provided with an American forum will weaken, since the inconvenience
to him if required to pursue the defendant abroad may be minor, or even
nonexistent. When the plaintiffs and the defendant's activities are both
localized or both international, the traditional bias in favor of the defendant
should again govern the result in the absence of any other justification for
disrupting it.56
An important corollary to the nature of the parties' activities is the
level of their activities. It may not be reasonable to assert jurisdiction in
the American forum with respect to a small foreign defendant-such as an
individual-whereas it may be reasonable if the defendant is large-such as
a foreign corporation. Likewise, an individual American plaintiff will usu-
ally be more able reasonably to compel the foreign defendant to defend in
the American forum than would a large American plaintiff.5 7 It is essen-
tial, however, that the level of activities always be considered in conjunction
with the nature of those activities. For example, a large foreign corpora-
tion's business might be conducted totally within its country, whereas an
individual foreigner may be a world traveller who has many contacts with
the United States.
In international litigation, "[a] country may consider it to be the pri-
mary task of its courts to serve its own nationals and not, or only exception-
ally, the citizens of foreign states." s58 American plaintiffs suing foreign
defendants will, therefore, normally have the sympathies of American
courts and the courts will have a strong interest in providing American citi-
zens with a forum. 59 As in all cases of jurisdiction by necessity, this inter-
est should be even stronger if there is only one American court open to the
plaintiff.60
The possibilities considered thus far have been broadly framed situa-
54. Id. at 1170.
55. Id.
56. Id. The traditional bias should be less strongly grounded if both parties' activities are
international.
57. See the discussion of Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
notes 66-75 infra and accompanying text.
58. M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (2d ed. 1950).
59. Compare the discussion of Majique Fashions, Ltd. v. Warwick & Co., N.Y.L.J., Aug.
1, 1978, at 5, col 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1978), notes 83-90 infra and accompanying text.
60. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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tions of jurisdiction by necessity. More particularly, the foreign defendant
may own property that is located in the United States. If he also has cer-
tain minimum contacts with the American forum, but the state has a restric-
tive long-arm statute, thereby not extending the exercise of personal
jurisdiction to the constitutional limits, quasi in rem jurisdiction may still
be reasonable. 61 But if the property is the foreign defendant's sole contact
with the United States and the plaintiff would have to leave the country to
sue the defendant if jurisdiction were denied, the necessity of providing an
American plaintiff with an American forum may make it reasonable in cer-
tain cases for the American court to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction with
respect to the foreign defendant's property.62
Because the presence of the foreign defendant's property is the sole
basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction by necessity, the relationship between the
property and the American forum should be an important factor in the de-
termination of reasonableness. It would most likely not be reasonable to
base jurisdiction, even jurisdiction by necessity, on property that is in the
forum either fortuitously or transiently. In other words, it should be fore-
seeable that the defendant's property might be used as a basis for jurisdic-
tion.63 Moreover, in light of the extraordinary jurisdiction being proposed,
any judgment for the American plaintiff should be limited to the value of
the property attached.64
The possible variations of the parties' interests, of the nature and level
of the parties' activities, and of the intensity of the state's interest indicate
that the standard of reasonableness in international litigation will not pro-
duce a blanket rule that will in turn yield a uniform result on the issue of
jurisdiction when the American plaintiff has only one American forum in
which to sue the foreign defendant. One thing, however, seems clear, and
indeed seems to follow inevitably from a balancing process: there will be
cases, after Shaffer, when personal jurisdiction by necessity will lie and
even more cases when courts may reasonably exercise quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion by necessity, even though the sole basis for jurisdiction is the presence
of the foreign defendant's property within the forum. One such case in
which the foreign defendant's property alone was enough to form a reason-
able basis for the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction is Feder v. Turkish
Airlines.65
61. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See
also note 80 infra and accompanying text.
64. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
65. 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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B. APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING PROCESS
1. Feder v. Turkish Airlines
The executors of the estate of Philip Feder brought a wrongful death
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against Turkish Airlines, a Turkish corporation. The plaintiffs could
not obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant anywhere in the United
States.66 The defendant did, however, have a bank account in New York,
and the district court granted an order of attachment 67 for $100,000 for the
dual purpose of "security for the plaintiffs' claim and the obtaining of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in respect of that claim."'68 The defendant ob-
jected on the grounds that such jurisdiction was invalid in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer.
Although the assets attached had no relationship to the underlying
claim and the defendant had no other contacts with New York, the district
court sustained quasi in rem jurisdiction. 69  The court distinguished
Shaffer by comparing the nature of the defendants' conduct in the two
cases. In Shaffer, the defendants had "simply... nothing to do with" the
State of Delaware.70 By contrast, in Feder "[t]he attachment [arose] from a
commercial bank account which [the defendant] voluntarily opened in New
York for the furtherance of its business. 71 The presence of the bank ac-
count in New York was not "unwitting," so the exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction was reasonable.72 One of the predictable risks assumed when a
66. [Turkish Airlines] does not conduct any business activities in the State of New
York. THY [Turkish Airlines] has no offices within New York, no employees working or
residing within the State, owns or leases no real or personal property within the United
States, pays no taxes in the United States, has no flights operating into or out of the state
of New York or the United States. Moreover, THY has never qualified to do business in
any state of the United States, including New York, and has never applied for a foreign
air carrier permit from the Civil Aeronautics Board which would permit THY to fly into
the United States.
Affidavit of George N. Tompkins, Jr. in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 2-3,
Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (on file at the Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal).
The author would like to thank Paul S. Edelman of the law firm of Kreindler & Kreindler,
New York City, who was the attorney for the plaintiffs in Feder, for supplying many docu-
ments involved in the case and for providing insights into the court's decision in Feder.
67. The attachment was authorized under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & R. § 6201(1) (McKin-
ney 1963). An order of attachment in New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & R. § 6211 (MeKin-
ney 1963), covers both the attachment of property and the garnishment of debts.
68. Memorandum and Order, at 1, Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal).
69. This decision was not appealed because the case was settled shortly after the decision
was rendered.
70. 441 F. Supp. at 1278.
71. Id. at 1279.
72. Id. at 1278.
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person makes voluntary contacts with a state had "come home to roost." 73
On the surface, the factual circumstances in Shaffer and Feder do not
differ significantly. From the fact that the two courts nonetheless reached
different results, one can infer from the Feder holding that the court consid-
ered and balanced the relevant interests at stake-a balancing that led the
court to conclude that it could reasonably exercise jurisdiction.
Turkish Airlines was a large corporation doing business internation-
ally. It had deliberately opened a bank account in New York in connec-
tion with its business. The potential unfairness and inconvenience of
requiring it to defend the plaintiff's claim in New York was therefore di-inished. The plaintiffs were individuals whose activities were completely
local in nature. If jurisdiction in New York had been denied, the plaintiffs
would have faced the prohibitive burden of having to leave the country to
sue the defendant in Turkey.74 The plaintiffs' judgment was to be limited
to the assets of the bank account attached. 75 These factors, together with
the strong public interest of providing an American forum to an individual
American plaintiff suing a large foreign corporation made it necessary and,
therefore, reasonable to base jurisdiction solely on the foreign defendant's
assets within New York.
2. Reconciling Seemingly Conflicting Results
In two cases that have been decided since Feder, American plaintiffs
suing foreign defendants have attempted to premise quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion solely on the presence of the defendants' bank accounts in New York.76
Although the two cases were factually very similar, the courts reached dif-
ferent results, one court upholding quasi in rem jurisdiction and the other
court denying it. Despite these conflicting results, when the balancing
analysis developed above 7 7 is applied to the facts of these cases, it appears
that the results may both be correct.
In Lime International Corp. v. Bank in Liechtenstein Aktiengesell-
schaft,78 a New York corporation sued a Liechtenstein bank to recover on a
performance bond. The defendant's only contact with New York was its
maintenance of three bank accounts there, which were unrelated to the
plaintiff's cause of action. Yet the United States District Court for the
73. Id.
74. Affidavit of Paul S. Edelman, Plaintiff's Attorney, at 2a, Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441
F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal).
75. Memorandum and Order, at 2, Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal.)
76. Lime Int'l Corp. v. Bank in Liechtenstein Aktiengesellschaft, No. 77 Civ. 5499-CSH
(S.D.N.Y., Jun. 29, 1978); Majique Fashions, Ltd. v. Warwick & Co., N.Y.LJ., Aug. 1, 1978, at
5, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1978).
77. See notes 49-65 supra and accompanying text.
78. No. 77 Civ. 5499-CSH (S.D.N.Y., Jun. 29, 1978).
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Southern District of New York refused to vacate an order of attachment of
the bank accounts, stating that "it should come as no surprise to defendant
to find whatever property it maintains here subjected to the legal process of
our courts."' 7 9 The court found the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction to
be reasonable, even after Shaffer, because it was foreseeable.80 The district
court also weighed the interests of the parties and of the state and refused to
dismiss the case on grounds of forum non conveniens because to do so
would have "deprive[d] a United States citizen of the recourse available in
its own courts. 8 1 The defendant argued that the action should have been
brought where its witnesses resided and where the tangible proof was lo-
cated; but the court said that such factors were "counterbalanced by the
inconvenience such a venue would work on plaintiff, who finds its witnesses
and essential documents in New York."'82
Quasi in rem jurisdiction based solely on the defendant's New York
bank account was also asserted in Mafjique Fashions, Ltd v. Warwick &
Co., 8 3 but the New York state court declined to sustain such jurisdiction.
Although the result of the Maique Fashions case may be correct, applica-
tion of an interest analysis suggests that the court's inquiry and reasoning
were incomplete.
The American plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a Hong Kong cor-
poration, had breached a contract that the parties had negotiated and per-
formed entirely in Korea. Since the defendant's bank account had no
relationship to the contract, the court held that jurisdiction was not reason-
able under Shaffer's standards. The court cited Feder and a more recent
Second Circuit case, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. ;84 but rather than
follow Feder, the facts of which were virtually identical to those of Majique
79. Id.
80. The district court interpreted Shaffer as speaking in terms of foreseeability. Conse-
quently, the question the court asked in this case was: "[W]ere the defendant-owner's actions
in dealing with his property such that he should reasonably have anticipated having to defend
it in the attaching forum?" Id. The court also cited language from Justice Stevens' concur-
ring opinion in Shaffer to the effect that the opening of a bank account in another state neces-
sarily gives rise to predictable risks. Id.
81. Id. The case is thus an example of an international quasi in rem jurisdiction by ne-
cessity case as described above.
82. Id. The court, although deciding whether to dismiss the action on forum non con-
veniens grounds, looked at the same interests that would be relevant in a jurisdictional deci-
sion in international litigation. See notes 49-65 supra and accompanying text. Had there been
another forum available in which the plaintiff could have brought his action but in which he
would not have been inconvenienced, then the court may have been justified in dismissing the
action, and indeed may have held that the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction was not rea-
sonable under the circumstances, because there was no necessity of providing the American
plaintiff with a forum. See note 89 infra.
83. N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1978, at 5, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1978).
84. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978). The court issued one opinion, but decided four cases at
once, upholding jurisdiction based on the attachment of the defendants' insurance policies that
were issued by insurance companies doing business in New York. The court by its decision
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Fashions, the court seized upon dictum in O'Connor to deny jurisdiction.8 5
It also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the plaintiff would have no
other forum in which to sue the defendant ifjurisdiction were denied. The
plaintiff could seek redress, the court noted, in the courts of either Hong
Kong or Korea.
The court in Maique Fashions did not reach its decision by applying
an analysis that weighed the interests of the parties and of the state. At first
glance, the court's denial of jurisdiction seems harsh, since it forces the
plaintiff to sue the defendant in a foreign country. This result further ap-
pears to ignore the state's interest in providing an American plaintiff with
an American forum.86 But as emphasized above, application of the weigh-
ing of interests in instances of international litigation will not yield uniform
results.87 A balancing process is essential. The facts of Maique Fashions
suggest that the plaintiff negotiated the contract in Korea, thereby indicat-
ing that it conducted business outside the United States.88 The incon-
venience to the plaintiff from having to return to Korea or Hong Kong to
sue the defendant might, therefore, be minimal.89 Correlatively, quasi in
rem jurisdiction might be unreasonable if the defendant were compelled to
defend the plaintiffs claim in the United States if the defendant was not
doing business anywhere outside Hong Kong and Korea.90 A valid dis-
tinction would thus exist between this case and Feder-in which a localized
individual American plaintiff sued a foreign corporation that was doing
business internationally-and quasi in rem jurisdiction based solely on the
defendant's bank account would have been correctly denied in Majique
Fashions.
rejected the defendants' argument that Shaffer had overruled Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,
216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
85. The Second Circuit had said that "[ilf the plaintiffs in these cases had 'attached' the
debt to defendants of a debtor only transitorily in New York, as in Harris v. Balk, or even
bank accounts maintained by them in New York, we would readily agree that attachment
jurisdiction could not be sustained when, as here, the defendants had no other 'contacts' with
New York." 579 F.2d at 198.
The state court in Majique Fashions found this language "more consistent with the language
employed in the holding of Shaffer .. " N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1978, at 6, col. 1. The Feder
court and the Lime International court looked to language in Justice Stevens' concurring opin-
ion in Shaffer to uphold the same kind of jurisdiction that was denied in Majique Fashions.
See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); note 80 supra.
86. See notes 29-30, 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
87. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
88. Although the facts stated in the opinion are not explicit on this point, this assumption
is drawn from language to the effect that the contract "was negotiated and performed entirely
in Korea... :' N.Y.LJ., Aug. 1, 1978, at 5, coL 4.
89. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text. Although this case is an example of
jurisdiction by necessity, the "necessity" for the court to provide the American plaintiff with an
American forum does not prevail here because of the relatively minor inconvenience to the
plaintiff in suing abroad.
90. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
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IV
FOREIGN RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
QUASI IN REM JUDGMENTS
In international litigation, American courts should keep two concerns
in mind when determining whether jurisdiction based solely on the attach-
ment of a foreign defendant's property is reasonable. First, a successful
American plaintiff may ultimately wish or need to seek recognition or en-
forcement of his judgment in a foreign country.91 Second, a foreign court
might exercise retaliatory jurisdiction over American defendants being sued
abroad if the foreign court considers the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion by American courts to be unreasonable.
An American plaintiff seeking recognition or enforcement in a foreign
country of a quasi in rem judgment rendered by an American court may be
faced with one of three unfavorable situations if the practice and procedure
of the foreign country and of the United States differ. The first situation
may occur when the American plaintiff has been successful in the original
action because the foreign defendant either defaulted or lost on the merits
but was permitted to make a limited appearance. If the plaintiffs claim
was larger than the value of the defendant's property upon which jurisdic-
tion was based, the plaintiff may wish to sue the defendant again to satisfy
fully his claim against that defendant. If the subsequent suit is brought in a
foreign country, the foreign court may not allow the plaintiff to sue again at
all, reasoning that the plaintiff has had his day in court and that the defend-
ant should not have to defend against the same claim twice.92
The second situation might arise when the foreign defendant made a
limited appearance in the original action and won on the merits. A foreign
country may permit the unsuccessful American plaintiff to sue the defend-
ant again in its courts but will give collateral estoppel effect to the original
action, thereby preventing the relitigation of any issues decided against the
plaintiff in the first action.93
91. For an explanation of the difference between the two terms "recognition" and "en-
forcement," see the Introductory Note to Topic 2 of Chapter 5, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 93-98 (1971).
It would be outside the scope of this Note to delve deeply into the area of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. The literature on the subject is voluminous. Therefore,
the problems that might arise in connection with the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction in
international litigation are posed and discussed, but no resolutions are attempted.
92. The contrary is the American rule. The plaintiff may sue again until his claim is fully
satisfied, RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 34, Comment g (1942), the only limitation being
that the same property cannot again serve as the basis for attachment jurisdiction, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
93. Traditionally, the U.S. rule has been just the contrary. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS § 34 (1942). But 4f. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75(c) & Comment d
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). See also Casad, supra note 12, at 82.
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The American plaintiff may face the third situation if he brings the
original action in one of the jurisdictions in the United States that does not
allow a defendant to enter a limited appearance but rather subjects him to
full personal liability if he contests the claim on the merits.94 In such a
jurisdiction, the foreign defendant will be forced to choose between making
a general appearance in order to defend his property and defaulting. It is
unlikely that a foreign court will recognize or enforce any resulting defi-
ciency judgment (the difference between the value of the property and the
amount of the plaintiffs whole claim) because of the coercion exerted on
the foreign defendant.95
The avoidance of retaliatory jurisdiction is an important concern in
several respects. "Conduct that is overly self-regarding with respect to the
taking and exercise of jurisdiction can disturb the international order and
produce political, legal, and economic reprisals. '96 When exercising quasi
in rem jurisdiction, an American court in international litigation "cannot
confine its analysis solely to its own ideas of what is just, appropriate, and
convenient. To a degree it must take into account the views of other com-
munities concerned." 97 American courts should also consider carefully the
assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction in circumstances when they would not
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment that was based on comparable ju-
risdiction because of the unreasonableness of such jurisdiction.9" Quasi in
rem jurisdiction in the United States has never been fully exploited relative
to some of its "disingenuous uses and abuses" 99 in other countries, 10° and
instances of retaliatory jurisdiction should be rare given the restriction of
quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer. 0 1
94. For example, the defendants in Shaffer, had jurisdiction been upheld, would have
been subject to full personal liability because no limited appearance was allowed. See note 3
supra.
95. American courts will recognize a quasi in rem judgment rendered in a foreign nation's
court, provided it is a valid judgment, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92
(1971), only insofar as it purports to affect the interests in the property that was before the
foreign court. Id. § 98, Comment d. That a deficiency judgment will be denied recognition
because it lacked a proper jurisdictional base has been stated as a certainty. Nadelmann, Juris-
dictionally Improper Fora, in XXTH CENTuRY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 321, 328
(K. Nadelmann, A. von Mehren, & J. Hazard eds. 1961). See also von Mehren & Trautman,
Recognition of Foreign Adjudcations: 4 Survey and a Suggested.4pproach, 81 HARv. L. REv.
1601 (1968).
96. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1127. For some examples of such retalia-
tion, see Nadelmann, supra note 95, at 330-31.
97. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1127. See also H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 780 (2d ed. 1976).
98. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1126.
99. 2 A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1973).
100. Id. at 24-25; Nadelmann, supra note 95;
101. American quasi in rem jurisdiction, by definition limited to the property attached, has
already been accepted as a reasonableness basis of jurisdiction. See A. EHRENZWEIG & E.
JAYME, supra note 99, at 25; text accompanying note 99 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Hetner extended the
reasonableness test of International Shoe and its progeny to exercises of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, thereby greatly restricting its use in domestic liti-
gation. Several types of quasi in rem jurisdiction, however, have survived
Shaffer's broad holding. One such type-quasi in rem jurisdiction by ne-
cessity-formed the focus of this Note.
A court can never presume the existence of quasi in rem jurisdiction by
necessity in any action. Rather, the availability of such jurisdiction is a
conclusion that is reached only after the interests of the parties and of the
state are balanced in light of the fact that there is only one forum open to
the plaintiff. In cases where the only possible basis for jurisdiction in the
one available forum is the presence of the defendant's property, and even
though the defendant has no other contacts with the forum, quasi in rem
jurisdiction by necessity in certain circumstances may still be reasonable
and thus reach beyond where personal jurisdiction would be constitution-
ally permissible.
In international litigation, the American plaintiff may have only one
forum in the United States in which to assert his claim against the foreign
defendant. That defendant may have no contact with the United States
except for property in the forum. Again the interests of the parties, the
nature and level of their activities, and the intensity of the state's interest
must be weighed to determine whether jurisdiction by necessity will lie. The
necessity of providing an American plaintiff with an American forum may
sometimes, but not always, make it reasonable for the state to base quasi in
rem jurisdiction solely on the presence of the defendant's property under
the rubric of jurisdiction by necessity.
Pamela A. Cummings*
The author would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont of the Cornell Law
School for his assistance in the initial spadework for this Note.
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